Comparing the Agency Costs of Family and Non–Family Firms: Conceptual Issues and Exploratory Evidence

By James J. Chrisman, Jess H. Chua, Reginald A. Litz. 2004

1,232 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bdc7a52fc5fda812253cf9371c05cf82736167e7

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In Accounting

In Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Citations in the corpus

The impact of small- and medium-sized family firms on economic growth (2015, background): “2001), the received wisdom is that aggregate agency costs are lower in family SMEs than non-family SMEs (Chrisman et al. 2004).”
The role of information asymmetry in the choice of entrepreneurial exit routes (2014, neutral): “This test is based on the assumption that late respondents are more similar to non-respondents than to early respondents (cf., Chrisman et al., 2004; Oppenheim, 1966).”
The Effects of Family Firm Specific Sources of Tmt Diversity: The Moderating Role of Information Exchange Frequency (2010, positive): “Accordingly, relying on family employees can minimize interest conflicts within the firm (Chrisman et al., 2004).”
Family Business Growth Around the World (2020, background): “, 2019; Lee, 2006; McConaughy & Phillips, 1999), and have focused mainly on small- and mediumsized entrepreneurial firms (Chen et al., 2014; Chrisman et al., 2004).”
Family Firm Heterogeneity: A Definition, Common Themes, Scholarly Progress, and Directions Forward (2021, background): “While family firms may benefit when owners are involved in management due to reduced agency costs (Chrisman et al., 2004), the presence of asymmetric altruism suggests that this is not always the case (e.”
Family Involvement in Ownership and Management: Exploring Nonlinear Effects on Performance (2008, background): “Chrisman, Chua, and Litz (2004) clustered firms on the basis of family involvement in ownership, management, and succession (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999), thus dividing their sample of 1,141 U.S. companies into family and nonfamily firms.”
Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs: The Importance of Intentions for Transgenerational Control (2012, background): “Finally, if intention for transgenerational control is related to socioemotional wealth and varies among family firms, it may also help explain why some family managers act as stewards and others act as agents (e.g., Chrisman et al. 2004, Eddleston and Kellermanns 2007).”