Competitive auctions and digital goods

By Andrew Vladislav Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Andrew Wright. ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2001

326 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms (2013, result): “The utility of any single priced offline truthful mechanism is bounded by OPT-Fix and [19] shows that the performance of OPT-Fix is close to that of OPT-Var.”
The value of knowing a demand curve: bounds on regret for online posted-price auctions (2003, background): “Competitive analysis of such auctions was introduced in [7], [8], where the authors consider strategyproof mechanisms for off-line auctions, i.”
Online algorithms: a survey (2003, background): “[53, 62], a fresh field that deserves further investigations.”
Towards Sharp Inapproximability For Any 2-CSP (2007, unknown): “There has been a lot of work on the unlimited supply auction problem [21, 19, 6, 2, 17, 23].”
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing (2005, background): “The performanc e of such auctions is often measured in comparison to the profit of the seller optimal envy-free pricings [13, 12],.”
Revenue maximization with a single sample (2010, unknown): “For example, our simple Single Sample mechanism is reminiscent of the “Pairing Mechanism” studied in [7], but the latter is not constant-competitive in the revenue benchmark analy-”
Mechanism Design via Differential Privacy (2007, unknown): “There has been a lot of work on the unlimited supply auction problem [21, 19, 6, 2, 17, 23].”