Lying and Team Incentives

By J. Conrads, Bernd Irlenbusch, Rainer Michael Rilke, Gari Walkowitz. Social Science Research Network, 2013

188 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bcdd55f8be5138279a940d185def5c0bf475306d

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Citations in the corpus

Let’s be honest: A review of experimental evidence of honesty and truth-telling (2014, background): “Specifically, female subjects are significantly less likely to overreport the true value of a die roll (Conrads et al., 2013, 2014), misrepresent a coin toss (Houser et al., 2012), engage in academic cheating (Ward and Beck, 1990), retain excessive change (Azar et al., 2013; Bersoff, 1999) and…”
Gender Differences in Honesty: The Role of Social Value Orientation (2017, background): “At the same time, Conrads et al. (2013) find a similar gender effect.”
Self-Serving Justifications (2015, background): “When a private roll of a die determines the payoff for a participant and a partner, the participant rolling the die becomes more willing to lie about the outcome to benefit the group (Conrads et al., 2013).”
Preferences for Truth‐Telling (2016, background): “This excludes games like Conrads et al. (2013) or d’Adda et al. (2014). We do allow that reporting has an effect on other subjects.”