Knowledge and lotteries

By J. O’leary-Hawthorne. 2005

1,240 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Weird people, yes, but also weird experiments (2010, neutral): “[rJH] Hawthorne, J. (2004) Knowledge and lotteries.”
EPISTEMIC INTUITIONS IN FAKE-BARN THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS (2014, background): “In addition, according to some epistemologists, whether or not an agent’s epistemic state counts as knowledge depends in part on ‘the stakes’: how much a mistake would cost her (Fantl and McGrath 2002; Hawthorne 2004; Stanley 2005; for a critical discussion, see Buckwalter and Schaffer forthcoming).”
The Modal Account of Luck (2014, background): “For a very different treatment of this problem, see Hawthorne (2004).”
EPISTEMIC ANXIETY AND ADAPTIVE INVARIANTISM (2010, methodology): “…figure as a factor in determining whether he knows, alongside traditional factors like the truth of the proposition he believes, his degree of confidence in that proposition, the reliability of his belief-formation method, and so forth (Fantl & McGrath, 2009; Hawthorne, 2004; Stanley, 2005).”
The Epistemic Side-Effect Effect (2010, background): “More recently, Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) defend the following ActionKnowledge Principle:”
Knowledge Isn’t Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language (2010, neutral): “Opposedtothisvieware the recent SSI theories of John Hawthorne (2004) and Jason Stanley (2005).”
Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed (2012, background): “23 Such theories have been defended by Fantl and McGrath 2002, Hawthorne 2004, and Stanley 2005.”