Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules

By Ronald M. Harstad. 2000

168 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b996a9b0ffcce0faf7f8566f35e46fbf320b1061

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Timothy N. Cason
2. Glenn W. Harrison
3. E Elisabet Rutström
4. Zuo-Jun Max Shen
5. Steffen Andersen
6. Peter P. Wakker
7. John Duffy
8. R. Walsh

In Marketing

1. Zuo-Jun Max Shen
2. Steffen Andersen
3. E Elisabet Rutström
4. Peter P. Wakker
5. Timothy N. Cason
6. John Duffy
7. R. Walsh
8. Nathaniel T. Wilcox

In Safety Research

1. Nathaniel T. Wilcox
2. Glenn W. Harrison
3. Timothy N. Cason
4. E Elisabet Rutström
5. Steffen Andersen
6. Peter P. Wakker
7. John Duffy
8. R. Walsh

Citations in the corpus

• Willingness-to-pay for food safety: an experimental investigation of quality certification on bidding behaviour (2004, unknown): “This is similar to the ‘‘throwaway bid’’ phenomenon (see for example Harstad, 2000; Cox et al., 1992).”
• Risk Aversion in the Laboratory (2008, methodology): “Of course, the BDM procedure is formally identical to a two-person Vickrey sealed-bid auction, with the same concerns about subjects not understanding dominant strategies without considerable training (Harstad, 2000; Rutström, 1998).”
• Customer Behavior Modeling in Revenue Management and Auctions: A Review and New Research Opportunities (2007, background): “…in second-price auctions are significantly higher than the prices in English auctions (e.g., Kagel, Harstad, and Levin 1987; Kagel and Levin 1993; Harstad 2000), except studies by Cop-pinger, Smith, and Titus (1980) and Cox, Roberson, and Smith (1982), in which bidding above valuations is not…”
• Estimating subjective probabilities (2014, methodology): “There is considerable controversy over the behavioral validity of this procedure, reviewed in Harrison, Martínez-Correa and Swarthout (2013a, b). and Karni (1999)).”
• The Chopstick Auction: A Study of the Exposure Problem in Multi-Unit Auctions (2009, result): “This nding is robust across phases and across rounds and it is in contrast to what is found in experiments by Kagel et al. (1987), Kagel and Levin (1993), and Harstad (2000) on the standard second-price sealed-bid auction.”
• Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms (2017, unknown): “Milgrom and Segal (2015) propose the use of a clock auction to repurchase broadcast rights.”
• Understanding Overbidding In Second Price Auctions: An Experimental Study (2008, methodology): “Both Kagel and Levin (1993) and Harstad (2000) further reported that experience has only a small e ect in reducing overbidding in SPA.”
• Misconceptions and Game Form Recognition: Challenges to Theories of Revealed Preference and Framing (2014, background): “…2010Þ, although the use of a coarse grid of possible valuation does not provide narrowly defined valuation estimates and thus is a relatively weak test Harstad ð2000Þ compares ascending-bid English auctions and second-price auctions and identifies the key role of feedback for promoting learning.”
• Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values (2004, background): “For example, consider an institution like the Vickrey auction, which is demand-revealing in theory, but yields bids exceeding values in the laboratory (Kagel et al., 1987; Harstad, 2000).”