Lobbying and welfare in a representative democracy

By T. Besley, Stephen Coate. 2001

237 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b951138b70252941a4ce8bcdd7538698fc29f0c6

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Citations in the corpus

Informational Lobbying and Political Contributions (2006, background): “A growing number of formal models assess the role of campaign contributions and party or candidate competition for interest group influence on policy outcomes (Austen-Smith, 1987; Baron, 1989, 1994; Snyder, 1990, 1991; Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 1996; Dixit et al., 1997; Besley and Coate, 2001).”
Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory And Evidence (2003, unknown): “The price of good x, denoted p, is determined by the government and the monopoly is required to meet all consumer demand at this price, subject to it not making a loss.(8) Each citizen has an identical demand function for good x, denoted x(p).”
Contribution to Productivity or Pork Barrel? : The Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment (2002, background): “As in Besley and Coate (2001), bribes from lobbies constitute part of the rents that motivate individuals to win elections.”
Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics (2010, unknown): “5 See Besley and Coate (2001) for an alternative perspective.”
The bigger the better? Evidence of the effect of government size on life satisfaction around the world (2007, background): “…between many candidates might lead to less excessive spending as voters can get rid more easily of those politicians who serve lobbying groups (Besley and Coate, 2001; Myerson, 1993).10 Furthermore, political competition might imply the necessity to form coalition governments which reflect a…”
Equity, efficiency and inequality traps: A research agenda (2007, background): “The capture of political decisions through lobbying has been studied by Grossman and Helpman [36], Besley and Coate [19], and many others.”
What Does Political Economy Tell Us about Economic Development - and Vice Versa? (2004, background): “Bradbury and Crain (2001), for example, find that government spending rises with the number of legislators, but that bicameralism dampens this effect.”
Is it Whom You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process (2011, unknown): “A non-exhaustive list of papers that have employed this approach includes AustenSmith (1987), Baron (1989), Baron (1994), Snyder (1990), Snyder (1991), Grossman and Helpman (1994), Dixit et al. (1997) and Besley and Coate (2001).”