What Does Political Economy Tell Us about Economic Development - and Vice Versa?
By Philip E. Keefer. 2004
128 citations recorded by the source corpus.
▪ Abstract This essay reviews how three pillars of political economy—collective action, institutions, and political market imperfections—help us answer the following question: Why do some countries develop and not others? Each advances our understanding of who wins and who loses in government decision making, generally, but only a subset of this literature helps us answer the question. The study of political market imperfections strongly suggests that the lack of credibility of pre-electoral political promises and incomplete voter information are especially robust in explaining development outcomes. From the institutional literature, the most powerful explanation of contrasting development outcomes links political checks and balances to the credibility of government commitments.
Subfields: Development, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science
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In Development
In Economics and Econometrics
- M. Busse
- C. Hefeker
- Hadjila Krifa-Schneider
- Iuliana Matei
- Brandon Julio
- Nabamita Dutta
- Youngsuk Yook
- Guglielmo Tosato
In Sociology and Political Science
Citations in the corpus
- Political risk, institutions and foreign direct investment (2007, background): “The connection between institutions and investments more generally is explored in Keefer (2004), Stasavage (2002), and Faria and Mauro (2004).”