Whispers in the Hyper-space: High-speed Covert Channel Attacks in the Cloud

By Zhenyu Wu, Zhang Xu, Haining Wang. USENIX Security Symposium, 2012

308 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

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A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware (2016, background): “Wu et al. [165] demonstrated that this type of channel is still exploitable in modern systems, achieving a rate of 340b/s between Amazon EC2 instances.”
CacheBleed: a timing attack on OpenSSL constant-time RSA (2016, background): “Covert channels were also observed with shared bus contention [30,53].”
Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical (2015, methodology): “However, the LLC is orders of magnitude larger and much slower to access than the L1 caches, which drastically reduces the temporal resolution of observable events and thus channel bandwidth, making most published LLC attacks unsuitable for cryptanalysis [32, 42, 43].”
ZombieLoad: Cross-Privilege-Boundary Data Sampling (2019, methodology): “So far, all cross-VM covert channels either relied on Prime+Probe [46, 50, 51, 59, 77], DRAMA [58], or bus locking [76].”
Context-Sensitive Fencing: Securing Speculative Execution via Microcode Customization (2019, background): “mizations such as caches, branch speculation, memory disambiguation, and even DVFS, through side-channels such as memory bus activity [4], power consumption characteristics [8], branch access patterns [2, 29], faults [47, 40], acoustics [33, 32], electromagnetic effects [30], functional unit timing ”