Investor Activism and Financial Market Structure

By T. Noe. 2002

245 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b72609ce32025e5b8f511de26cc178c9d73899ff

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Citations in the corpus

Local Ownership as Private Information: Evidence on the Monitoring-Liquidity Trade-Off (2007, background): “Kahn and Winton (1998), Bolton and Von Thadden (1998a, 1998b) and Noe (2002) have identified the relative costs and benefits of concentrated shareholdings and analyzed the circumstances in which these shareholdings will emerge.”
Opportunity makes a thief (2018, result): “In line with these findings, other research confirms the idea that outside shareholders closely monitor management (Kahn & Winton, 1998; Bloch & Hege, 2001; Noe, 2002).”
Corporate Governance and Liquidity (2010, unknown): “Using an alternative definition of liquidity (i.e., the ability to trade anonymously) several authors also show that liquidity increases the incentive to monitor by lowering the cost of acquiring large positions (see Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998), and Noe (2002)).”
The 'Wall Street Walk' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice (2007, unknown): “…(1994); Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi (1997); Bolton and Von Thadden (1998); Kahn and Winton (1998); Maug (1998); Katz and Owen (2001); Tirole (2001); Noe (2002); Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole (2004); Faure-Grimaud and Gromb (2004); Hartzell and Starks (2004); Mello and Repullo (2004); Yung (2005); and…”
Public Trading and Private Incentives (2004, background): “Instead, modeling liquidity as the ability to hide one’s trade, Kyle and Vila (1991), Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998), and Noe (2002) argue that it can foster the emergence of active investors in the first place.”
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors (2015, unknown): “10 See, for example, O’Hare (2003) for this debate.”
Sharing of Control versus Monitoring as Corporate Governance Mechanisms (2006, unknown): “In contrast, Noe (2002) allows for multiple monitors, demonstrating that the relation between shareholdings and activism may not bemonotonic: among the investors who monitor with positive probability, those with smaller holdings are the most active.”
Liquidity and Shareholder Activism (2015, background): “This allows an activist to cover monitoring costs by profits made through informed trading prior to intervention. A similar mechanism of speculative trading and intervention is presented in Kahn and Winton (1998) who focus on the effect of firm characteristics, rather than liquidity, on institutiona”