Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions

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Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values (2003, methodology): “More recently, relying on the latter, the structural approach has been extended to other auction paradigms such as the more general affiliated private value (APV) by Li et al. (2000, 2002) and the pure common value (CV) paradigm by Haile et al. (2000), Li et al. (2000) and Hendricks et al. (2001).”
Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions (2004, unknown): “This “bad news” (Milgrom (1981)) becomes “worse” as the number of opponents increases–having the most optimistic signal among many bidders implies (on average) greater over-optimism than does being most optimistic among a few bidders.”
SOME EXTENSIONS OF A LEMMA OF KOTLARSKI (2012, background): “…estimate a wide variety of models in economics, such as measurement error models (e.g., Li and Vuong, 1998; Schennach, 2004), auction models (e.g., Li, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000; Krasnokutskaya, 2011), panel data models (e.g., Arellano and Bonhomme, 2009; Evdokimov, 2008, 2010), and in various…”
Econometric models of asymmetric ascending auctions (2003, unknown): “29 For the symmetric model of Milgrom and Weber (1982), Bikhchandani et al.”
Are bid preferences benign? The effect of small business subsidies in highway procurement auctions (2007, methodology): “Following Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), I will use the triweight kernel K(u) = 35 32 (1 − u 2 ) 3 1(|u| ≤ 1).”