The Competitive Advantage of Sanctioning Institutions

By Özgür Gürerk, Bernd Irlenbusch, Bettina Rockenbach. Science, 2006

882 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b6d76dbd62eb775ba525ffd12639fb2a4cab7f76

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. David G. Rand
2. Matthias Sutter
3. Martin G. Kocher
4. Simon Gächter
5. Ananish Chaudhuri
6. Benedikt Herrmann
7. Charles N. Noussair
8. Justin M. Rao

In Safety Research

1. David G. Rand
2. Ananish Chaudhuri
3. Matthias Sutter
4. Martin G. Kocher
5. Simon Gächter
6. Matjaz Perc
7. Benedikt Herrmann
8. Attila Szolnoki

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Matjaz Perc
2. David G. Rand
3. Attila Szolnoki
4. Zhen Wang
5. Ananish Chaudhuri
6. Benedikt Herrmann
7. Martin G. Kocher
8. Stefano Boccaletti

Citations in the corpus

• What's the right thing to do? Increasing pro-sociality with simple moral nudges (2017, neutral): “One strand of literature has focused on mechanisms such as punishing free-riders (12-15), rewarding pro-socials (16-18) and the interplay between these two (19-22).”
• Cooperation and Contagion in Web-Based, Networked Public Goods Experiments (2010, background): “introducing sanctioning institutions [7], this mechanism does not change the game by giving players another action, but instead exploits the network on which the game is being played.”
• The promise of Mechanical Turk: how online labor markets can help theorists run behavioral experiments. (2012, background): “An example is given by fascinating experiments that have explored endogenous choice, where participants pick one of several games to play (Gurerk et al., 2006; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; Sutter et al., 2010).”
• A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public-good experiments (2008, neutral): “and Putterman 2006, Bochet et al. (2006), Cinyabuguma et al. (2006), Gurerk et al. (2006) , Carpenter (2007b), Denant-Boemont et al. (2007).”
• Institution formation in public goods games (2006, background): “In the theory part of our paper, we show that two different types of subgame perfect Nash equilibria exist in this game, a so-called organizational equilibrium , where players successfully implement an organization, and a so-called status quo equilibrium , where no organization is implemented.”
• Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment - An Experimental Study (2012, neutral): “For the original references in social sciences, see Yamagishi (1986), Ostrom et al.”