Sheltering Corporate Assets from Political Extraction
By L. Caprio, Mara Faccio, John J. McConnell. 2013
207 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Sociology and Political Science, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b5fcf9ca2112ed188c38e47660c220cd2541f7ca
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Citations in the corpus
- Political Institutions and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior (2015, unknown): “Caprio et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2014) relate political institutions to firms’ cash and liquid assets holdings.”
- Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk (2014, unknown): “See for example Caprio et al (2012).”
- Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, unknown): “12 Caprio et al. (2009), Djankov et al.”
- Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, unknown): “Caprio et al. (2008) provide empirical evidence that firms structure their asset holdings so as to shelter assets from politicians and bureaucrats, especially in countries where the threat of political extraction is high.”
- US political corruption and firm financial policies (2016, background): “3 Caprio et al. (2013) find that the cash ratio is approximately 15% lower when corruption increases one standard deviation.”
- Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China (2016, methodology): “Studying 109 countries and using firm cash holdings in 2005 as the dependent variable, Caprio et al. (2013) report that when a country’s corruption level is high, a firm’s cash holdings, on average, are low and vice versa.”
- The Role of State and Foreign Owners in Corporate Risk-Taking: Evidence from Privatization (2013, unknown): “All the variables are widely used in the literature as a measure of country-level governance institutions (e.g., Durnev and Fauver, 2009; Caprio et al., 2011; among others).”
- Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences (2015, unknown): “However, if weak legal protection allows corrupt politicians to extract cash from firms, they tend to hold less cash and more physical assets, which make it harder for politicians to extract rents (Caprio et al., 2013).”
- The effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings (2014, unknown): “First, a good government refrains from expropriating firms, and as a result firms can hold more cash with less fear over government extraction (i.e., the expropriation argument) (Caprio et al., 2013).”