Political Institutions and Bank Risk-Taking Behavior

By Badar Nadeem Ashraf. 2015

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We examine the influence of political institutions on bank risk-taking behavior using an international sample of banks from 98 countries over the period 1998-2007. We find that bank risk-taking is significantly higher in sound political institutions countries suggesting that increased competition from alternate sources of financing due to financial constraints mitigation effect and moral hazard problems linked with better political institutions lead banks to increase bank risk-taking. Our results are economically significant, and are robust to alternative bank risk-taking measures, alternate proxies of political institutions, cross-sectional and country-level regressions, endogeneity concerns of political institutions, alternate samples, and sample extension from 1998 to 2012. Further analysis shows that positive influence of political institutions on bank risk-taking is independent of income levels of countries. Results also show that positive influence of political institutions on bank risk-taking is robust in countries having explicit deposit insurance and suggest that moral hazard problems linked with sound political institutions complement the moral hazard problems of explicit deposit insurance. We also examine the interdependence between political and legal institutions and find that political and legal institutions complement each other to influence bank risk-taking behavior.

Subfields: Accounting

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4e4776937cf18c329f9a6afe82afef3ae1966696

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In Accounting

  1. Yinjie Shen
  2. Badar Nadeem Ashraf

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