Agency Costs and Ownership Structure

By James S. Ang, Rebel A. Cole, James Lin. 2000

2,512 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b5b306dd06b24f7dd9626d0c3f335e72ed9694f9

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Citations in the corpus

How does owners’ exposure to idiosyncratic risk influence the capital structure of private companies? (2008, positive): “This study has been widely used for empirical analysis, see, for example Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1994) for studies on lending relationships or Ang et al. (2000) and Bitler et al.”
CSR disclosure and firm performance: The mediating role of corporate reputation and moderating role of CEO integrity (2020, positive): “Because the agency theory depicts a phenomenon opposite to that suggested by the ethical leadership theory, the measures for the agency cost developed by Ang et al. (2000) can be adapted to proxy CEO integrity.”
On the Determinants and Dynamics of Trade Credit Use: Empirical Evidence from Business Start-ups (2006, neutral): “, the Federal Reserve Board's National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) provides financial information on 4,637 privately held firms, but Ang et al. (2000) report that mean firm age in this database is 17.”
Corporate Governance and Financial Distress: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies (2006, background): “…add to the likelihood of financial distress because, first, job perks cause shrinkage in company resources; second, higher management discretion, to a large extent, suggests greater agency conflicts (Singh and Davidson 2003) as well as insufficient monitoring technology (Ang, Cole, and Lin 2000).”
Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the Current University Invention Ownership Model (2009, background): “A somewhat different formulation by Jensen and Thursby (2001) models the TLO as an agent of both the inventor and the university.”
The demand and supply of external finance for innovative firms (2013, background): “In most cases, it is closely related to agency problems, which typically cause firms to over- or under-invest (Ang, 1992; Ang et al., 2000).”
Driving factors of innovation in family and non-family SMEs (2018, background): “Usually smaller family firms do not have to deal with these so-called agency costs (Corbetta and Salvato 2004) since management positions can be filled with family members (Ang et al. 2000; Carnes and Ireland 2013; Cruz et al. 2012).”