Spatial prisoner's dilemma optimally played in small-world networks
By Naoki Masuda, Kazuyuki Aihara. 2003
193 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Cooperation is commonly found in ecological and social systems even when it apparently seems that individuals can benefit from selfish behavior. We investigate how cooperation emerges with the spatial prisoner's dilemma played in a class of networks ranging from regular lattices to random networks. We find that, among these networks, small-world topology is the optimal structure when we take into account the speed at which cooperative behavior propagates. Our results may explain why the small-world properties are self-organized in real networks.
Subfields: Sociology and Political Science, Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b570968afff14eb7821ad2ab2e195d95037e5cc3
How researchers see this paper
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In Sociology and Political Science
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- Carlos P. Roca
- Ángel Sánchez
- José A. Cuesta
- György Szabó
- Michael Doebeli
- Zhen Wang
In Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
- Matjaz Perc
- Attila Szolnoki
- Michael Doebeli
- C. Hauert
- György Szabó
- Carlos P. Roca
- Ángel Sánchez
- José A. Cuesta
Citations in the corpus
- Coevolutionary games - A mini review (2009, background): “, 2009; Li et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2009b) and the snowdrift game (Wang et al., 2006; Lee et al., 2008; Roca et al., 2009b), covering also smallworld (Abramson and Kuperman, 2001; Kim et al., 2002; Masuda and Aihara, 2003; Tomochi, 2004; Santos et al., 2005; Zhong et al., 2006; Tomassini et al., 2”
- Evolutionary games on graphs (2006, methodology): “ective catalyzing role. Denoting by Ω¯ x = {x,Ωx} the neighborhood which includes agent x as well, a possible form used by Nowak et al. (1994a,b) and their followers (e.g., (Alonso-Sanz et al., 2001; Masuda and Aihara, 2003)) for the Prisoner’s Dilemma is w(s x→ s′ ) = λ P y∈Ω¯ x(s′ x ) g(Uy) P y∈Ω¯”
- Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game (2005, background): “…results indicate that the lattice topology does affect the dynamics of cooperation and that, interestingly, relaxing the rigid purely local neighbourhood structure of lattices seems to benefit cooperation (Abramson & Kuperman 2001; Masuda & Aihara 2003; Ifti et al. 2004; Hauert & Szabó 2005).”
- Evolutionary game theory: Temporal and spatial effects beyond replicator dynamics (2009, result): “This conclusion is in agreement with existent theoretical work about small-world networks, on Prisoner’s Dilemma [84,104,105] and its extensions [122,123], on Snowdrift games [96], and also with experimental studies on coordination games [124].”