Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership

By Eli Ofek, David Yermack. 2000

632 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b4de5beeb129430fc4c59effe6177eed2acbab01

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Citations in the corpus

Managerial Short-Termism and Investment: Evidence from Accelerated Option Vesting* (2019, positive): “Our finding that CEOs unwound their equity incentives after vesting periods were eliminated is consistent with Ofek and Yermack (2002) and EFL, who document that CEOs sell stock after they receive new equity grants or prior grants vest.”
An empirical examination of the costs and benefits of executive stock options: Evidence from Japan (2005, background): “Ofek and Yermack (2000) find in the U.S. that stock option grants do not lead to increases in overall ownership because managers tend to sell the underlying shares acquired upon exercise of the options.”
Corporate social responsibility and CEO confidence (2017, neutral): “This early exercise behaviour is supported by empirical findings (Huddart and Lang, 1996 and Ofek and Yermack, 2000).”
With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders (2009, background): “For example, CEO ownership amounts to less than 5 percent in more than 90 percent of U.S. corporations (Ofek and Yermack , 2000), outside ownership is often dispersed (Berle and Means, 1932), and corporate boards, even ones dominated by outsiders, are frequently ineffective in disciplining the…”
Employee Stock Options, EPS Dilution, and Stock Repurchases (2003, background): “Rabin (2002) argues that this phenomenon arises from investor belief in the “law of small numbers.”
Executive Stock Option Exercises and Inside Information (2001, methodology): “In addition, Seyhun (1986, 1998) ¯nds that insider trades are more pro¯table the smaller the ¯rm and the closer the insider to top management.”
Trading incentives to meet the analyst forecast (2006, background): “First, stock-based compensation arrangements such as options and shares have been a significant source of incentives for managers in recent years (Hall & Liebman, 1998; Ofek & Yermack, 2000).”
Managerial Stock Ownership and the Maturity Structure of Corporate Debt (2005, background): “For our sample of 6,246 firm-year observations, the mean managerial stock ownership level of 4.46 percent is larger than that reported by Ofek and Yermack (2000).”