Executive Stock Option Exercises and Inside Information

By Jennifer N. Carpenter, Barbara Remmers. 2001

207 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f3ddd4916fbf563016d6467b0f299fd9fbdc67ba

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Citations in the corpus

The Efficiency of Equity-Linked Compensation: Understanding the Full Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Options (2001, background): “…and that the market understands the great incentive that managers in such firms have to diversify.13 Consistent with Meulbroek (2000a)’s results on executive stock sales, Carpenter and Remmers (2000) find that executive stock option exercises tend to take place for non-informational reasons.”
The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal on Shareholders (2009, methodology): “The table reports buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) based on 5x5 size/momentum (column [1]) or size/bookto-market (column [2]) reference portfolios, following Barber et al. (1999) and similar, among others, to Carpenter’ and Remmers’ (2001) study of stock options’ exercises.”
Private Information, Earnings Manipulations, and Executive Stock Option Exercises (2004, unknown): “Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find a differential timing effect of exercises based on firm size.”
Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance (2009, background): “Carpenter and Remmers (2001) find that insiders time the exercise of stock options based on private information and Lie (2005) finds that abnormal stock returns are negative before unscheduled awards and positive after, and this pattern has 7 become stronger over time.”
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of Insider Trading (2013, background): “share purchases, given that average share sales are more likely driven by managers’ portfolio diversification needs (Carpenter and Remmers 2001; Jeng et al. 2003).”