The importance of IRS monitoring to debt pricing in private firms

By Omrane Guedhami, Jeffrey A. Pittman. 2008

164 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b1d47d5659183a27f9301958bec4d112c763abbe

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Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Tax Authority Monitoring and Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality (2014, unknown): “The method of aggregation reduces concerns that managers can affect the probability of an IRS audit (e.g., by changing the book-tax difference), mitigating concerns of reverse causality (Guedhami and Pittman 2008; El Ghoul et al. 2011).”
Earnings Management, Corporate Tax Shelters, and Book-Tax Alignment (2009, background): “Similarly, Guedhami and Pittman (2007) find evidence that debt financing is cheaper when the probability of a face-to-face IRS audit is higher.”
The Effects of Regulatory Scrutiny on Tax Avoidance: An Examination of SEC Comment Letters (2016, background): “Third, we contribute to the literature on the spillover effect of regulatory scrutiny, which to date have focused only on the effect of IRS actions (Guedhami and Pittman 2008; Hanlon, Hoopes, and Shroff 2014).”
A review of tax research (2010, unknown): “h The measure is a financial accounting accrual subject to the conservative or ‘‘aggressive’’ nature of the firm for financial accounting purposes. i The measure will not include firms that are not caught nor will it include firms that can otherwise avoid tax successfully and do not engage in shelte”
Do IRS Audits Deter Corporate Tax Avoidance (2012, methodology): “We follow Guedhami and Pittman (2008) and Hanlon et al.”
Tax Avoidance and Geographic Earnings Disclosure (2013, unknown): “Prior studies find that a higher threat of an IRS audit increases financial reporting quality (Hanlon, Hoopes, and Shroff 2011) and lowers the cost of equity and debt financing (e.g., Guedhami and Pittman 2008; Ghoul, Guedhami, and Pittman 2011 ).”
Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, unknown): “For example, Guedhami et al. (2013) find that public firms with political connections are more likely to appoint a Big Four auditor and that connected firms with Big Four auditors have lower cost of equity than connected firms without.”