Tax Avoidance and Geographic Earnings Disclosure

By Ole‐Kristian Hope, M. Ma, Wayne B. Thomas. 2013

332 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/63769a41bdb25374350fa931f62010104983d7ed

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Citations in the corpus

The Effects of Regulatory Scrutiny on Tax Avoidance: An Examination of SEC Comment Letters (2016, background): “For example, Hope, Ma, and Thomas (2013) find that firms engaged in higher levels of tax avoidance exploited discretion in segment reporting to hide foreign segments, presumably to withhold information from taxing authorities.”
Tax avoidance, corporate governance, and corporate social responsibility: The case of the Egyptian capital market (2020, methodology): “ETR is commonly used as a good proxy to capture tax avoidance in academic research (Hoi et al., 2013; Hope et al., 2013; Laguir et al., 2015 Lanis & Richardson, 2013).”
Is Tax Avoidance Related to Firm Risk (2017, background): “For example, Hope et al. (2013) present evidence that a greater degree of tax avoidance is accompanied by lower disclosure of geographic segments, and Lev and Nissim (2004) and Dhaliwal et al. (2015) present evidence that tax expense is an indicator of earnings quality.”
Corporate Social Responsibility, Institutional Environments, and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from a Subnational Comparison in China (2017, methodology): “We include a set of firm-specific variables to ensure that our results are robust for commonly used control variables (e.g. Chen et al., 2010; Hoi et al., 2013; Hope et al., 2013; Lanis & Richardson, 2012; Rego & Wilson, 2012).”
Public Pressure and Corporate Tax Behavior (2016, unknown): “One possible exception is Hope et al. (2013), who find firms that discontinued disclosure of geographic earnings after the implementation of SFAS 131 had lower ETRs than other firms.”