The functional nature of conspiracy beliefs: Examining the underpinnings of belief in the Da Vinci Code conspiracy

By Anna-Kaisa Newheiser, M. Farias, Nicole Tausch. 2011

145 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b1a08cbc407f1a20b3c72d31b196b4a4634244cc

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Citations in the corpus

Measuring Belief in Conspiracy Theories: The Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (2013, background): “…recent publications on the topic (e.g., Leman and Cinnirella, 2007; Douglas and Sutton, 2008, 2011; Bogart et al., 2010; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Darwin et al., 2011; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami, 2012; Wood et al., 2012; Jolley and Douglas, 2013) suggests that research is gaining momentum.”
Understanding Conspiracy Theories (2019, background): “New Age believers are more likely to believe Da Vinci Code conspiracy theories than are Catholics (Newheiser et al., 2011), and sports fans are more likely to believe that other teams engage in shenanigans rather than their favorites (Carey, Nyhan, Valentino, & Liu, 2016).”
The Influence of Control on Belief in Conspiracy Theories: Conceptual and Applied Extensions (2015, background): “29: 753–761 (2015) people are most likely to believe in conspiracy theories when they lack control (Hamsher et al., 1968; Newheiser et al., 2011; Sullivan et al., 2010; Van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008).”
Belief in Conspiracy Theories and Susceptibility to the Conjunction Fallacy (2014, result): “The significant correlation between conspiracist ideation and paranormal beliefs observed in the present study, as well as previous research (Darwin et al., 2011; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011) , adds support to the idea that similar factors give rise to both kinds of anomalous belief.”
“I Know Things They Don’t Know!”: The Role of Need for Uniqueness in Belief in Conspiracy Theories (2017, background): “This control seemed the most relevant, because previous work showed that the best predictor of a specific conspiracy belief is the belief in other conspiracy theories (e.g., Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011).”
Speaking (Un–)Truth to Power: Conspiracy Mentality as A Generalised Political Attitude (2014, methodology): “…as conspiracy beliefs have previously been associated with powerlessness (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999), anomia (Goertzel, 1994), death anxiety (Newheiser et al., 2011), lack of control (McCauley & Jacques, 1979) and general personality factors such as agreeableness (Swami et al., 2011), we…”
Epistemic rationality: Skepticism toward unfounded beliefs requires sufficient cognitive ability and motivation to be rational (2018, background): “…beliefs are promoted by various epistemic and existential motives, such as the need for control (Van Prooijen&Acker, 2015; Whitson&Galinsky, 2008), uncertainty management (Van Prooijen& Jostmann, 2013), terror management (Newheiser et al., 2011), and ideology protection (Van Prooijen et al., 2015).”
Someone is pulling the strings: hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories (2016, background): “Furthermore, paranormal beliefs strongly correlate with endorsement of conspiracy theories (Darwin et al., 2011; Newheiser et al., 2011; Stieger et al., 2013).”