“I Know Things They Don’t Know!”: The Role of Need for Uniqueness in Belief in Conspiracy Theories

By A. Lantian, Dominique Muller, Cécile Nurra, Karen M. Douglas. 2017

140 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Literature and Literary Theory, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/23977728124dcb570e85b319140a811923c4b8cb

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Cognitive Neuroscience

1. P. Lamberty
2. R. Imhoff
3. L. Dieterle

In Literature and Literary Theory

1. R. Imhoff
2. P. Lamberty

In Sociology and Political Science

1. P. Lamberty
2. R. Imhoff
3. L. Dieterle
4. Karen M. Douglas
5. Robbie M. Sutton
6. J. Pierre

Citations in the corpus

• A Bioweapon or a Hoax? The Link Between Distinct Conspiracy Beliefs About the Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak and Pandemic Behavior (2020, background): “This is relevant, as endorsement of conspiracy beliefs has been associated with an increased need for uniqueness in both correlational and experimental studies (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian et al., 2017).”
• Durably reducing conspiracy beliefs through dialogues with AI (2024, unknown): “Popular explanations propose that people adopt conspiracy theories to sate underlying psychic “ needs ” or motivations, such as thedesirefor control over one ’ s environment and experiences ( 15 ), certainty and predictability ( 20 ), security and stability ( 21 ), and uniqueness ( 22 ).”
• Resolving the Puzzle of Conspiracy Worldview and Political Activism: Belief in Secret Plots Decreases Normative but Increases Nonnormative Political Engagement (2021, background): “As another example, scholars from France (Lantian et al., 2017) and Germany (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017) have independently gathered support for the notion that conspiracy theories are particularly appealing to those who have a high need to see themselves as particularly unique.”
• Mistrust and misinformation: A two-component, socio-epistemic model of belief in conspiracy theories (2020, unknown): “, 2018); conjunction fallacies (Brotherton & French, 2014); need for control, certainty, cognitive closure, and uniqueness (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2017; Lantian et al., 2017; Marchlewska, Cichocka, & Kossowska, 2018; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; van Prooijen & Acker, 2015); “bullshit receptivity” ”