Epistemic rationality: Skepticism toward unfounded beliefs requires sufficient cognitive ability and motivation to be rational
By Tomas Ståhl, J. Prooijen. 2018
177 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Social Psychology, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9785c3762647d1ce57c64f5044b36aa4c832999d
How researchers see this paper
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In Cognitive Neuroscience
In Social Psychology
In Sociology and Political Science
- Robbie M. Sutton
- Karen M. Douglas
- A. Cichocka
- J. Uscinski
- T. Nefes
- Farzin Deravi
- Chee Siang Ang
- P. Lamberty
Citations in the corpus
- Understanding Conspiracy Theories (2019, background): “For example, Swami (2012) asked a sample of Malaysian participants to complete a scale of conspiracy belief, a scale specifically concerning anti-Jewish conspiracy theories (e.”
- Mistrust and misinformation: A two-component, socio-epistemic model of belief in conspiracy theories (2020, unknown): “…2018; Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 2011; van Prooijen & Acker, 2015); “bullshit receptivity” and lack of analytic thinking (Hart & Graether, 2018; Ståhl & van Prooijen, 2018; Swami et al., 2014); and paranoia/schizotypy (Dagnall et al., 2015; Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Grzesiak-Feldman &…”