DOES INTRAFIRM BARGAINING MATTER IN THE LARGE FIRM'S MATCHING MODEL?

By Pierre Cahuc, Étienne Wasmer. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 2001

124 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b0a0343cbeda2f86bd06050ac1255011649dd7bd

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Citations in the corpus

A THEORY OF WAGES AND LABOR DEMAND WITH INTRA‐FIRM BARGAINING AND MATCHING FRICTIONS* (2008, unknown): “14 It is interesting to remark that rUi is a reservation wage: indeed, from (6), it is clear that workers are indifferent between employment and unemployment i.”
Wage bargaining with on-the-job search: Theory and evidence (2006, unknown): “The definition (6) of φ0(ε, p) together with the definition (7) of pinf shows that entry wages, received by individuals who exit from unemployment, are not necessarily higher than the unemployment income.”
Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market (2015, unknown): “in Cahuc and Wasmer (2001). We are not aware of efficiency results when on-the-job search is introduced into such a model.”
Job Search and Mobility in Developing Countries. Theory and Policy Implications (2008, background): “However, as shown by Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), under the assumption of a perfect capital market and constant returns to scale in all factors, the wage bargaining solution (see below) is identical whether one considers large firms that employ more than one worker or firms employing only one worker (as”
Firm Dynamics, Job Turnover, and Wage Distributions in an Open Economy (2016, unknown): “This implies that bargaining is over the marginal product of labor, and all workers at a firm in a particular state (z, l) are paid the same wage (Stole and Zwiebel 1996; Cahuc and Wasmer 2001; Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer 2008).”
Offshoring and Unemployment: The Role of Search Frictions and Labor Mobility (2009, background): “Hence, the second stage wage is e¤ectively independent of the rst stage employment choice (see Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) for a formal proof).”