A THEORY OF WAGES AND LABOR DEMAND WITH INTRA‐FIRM BARGAINING AND MATCHING FRICTIONS*

By Pierre Cahuc, Francois Marque, Étienne Wasmer. 2008

154 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1bfb63b7085a5af48604589acffe6b289044352e

Citations in the corpus

• Firm Dynamics, Job Turnover, and Wage Distributions in an Open Economy (2016, unknown): “This implies that bargaining is over the marginal product of labor, and all workers at a firm in a particular state (z, l) are paid the same wage (Stole and Zwiebel 1996; Cahuc and Wasmer 2001; Cahuc, Marque, and Wasmer 2008).”
• The Effectiveness of Hiring Credits (2019, unknown): “However, wage bargaining in large (i.e. with more than one employee) rms with decreasing marginal productivity of labor induces over-employment, as shown by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and Cahuc et al. (2008).”