From Nash and Brown to Maynard Smith: Equilibria, Dynamics and ESS
By Josef Hofbauer. 2001
141 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/afb469e05c2fcf7465fb3fe2a1543681e68dd480
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Citations in the corpus
- Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics (2010, background): “However, Maynard Smith and Price’s (1973) conditions retain their importance in this new context: Taylor and Jonker (1978), Hofbauer et al. (1979), Zeeman (1980), and Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988) show that ESS provides a sufficient condition for local stability under the replicator dynamic. Because i”
- BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR CONTINUOUS ZERO{SUM GAMES (2005, unknown): “Consider the best response dynamics ([10], [12], [13], [14]) on X×Y ẋ ∈ BR1(y)− x, ẏ ∈ BR2(x)− y.”
- Individual and cultural learning in stag hunt games with multiple actions (2010, background): “5Showing that our main results hold with discrete dynamics as well is a straightforward, though somewhat involved, exercise. equilibria (Hopkins, 1999; Hofbauer et al., 1979; Hofbauer, 2000).”
- Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection (2015, background): “See Taylor and Jonker (1978), Cressman (1997), Hofbauer (2000), and Sandholm (2010a).”