Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics

By William H. Sandholm. 2010

64 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We prove that any regular evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of regular ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics.

Subfields: Genetics, Management Science and Operations Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1576138735203785fdeb4da22824fadb3de99f55

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Genetics

1. Daisuke Oyama
2. Olivier Tercieux

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Daisuke Oyama
2. Olivier Tercieux
3. William H. Sandholm
4. Josef Hofbauer

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Daisuke Oyama
2. Olivier Tercieux
3. William H. Sandholm

Citations in the corpus

• Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection (2015, background): “See Sandholm (2010b) for accounts of these and other examples.”