BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS FOR CONTINUOUS ZERO{SUM GAMES
By Josef Hofbauer, Sylvain Sorin. 2005
119 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research, Modeling and Simulation
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a0def6517d5b67851fda2138aec9f35b7dbd65eb
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Economics and Econometrics
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Karl Sigmund
- Tamer Basar
- Hédy Attouch
- Josef Hofbauer
- Kush R. Varshney
- Scott E. Page
- Russell Golman
- William H. Sandholm
In Modeling and Simulation
- Paul-Emile Maingé
- Karl Sigmund
- Hédy Attouch
- Josef Hofbauer
- Antonin Chambolle
- Muhammad Aslam Noor
- Radu Ioan Bot
- Ernö Robert Csetnek
Citations in the corpus
- ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR OF SECOND-ORDER DISSIPATIVE EVOLUTION EQUATIONS COMBINING POTENTIAL WITH NON-POTENTIAL EFFECTS ∗ (2009, background): “A central question in game theory, decision sciences and economics is to describe realistic dynamics which converge to Nash equilibria, see [30] and the references herein.”
- Nash Equilibrium Seeking in Noncooperative Games (2012, background): “Continuous-time best response dynamics are studied for more general scenarios in [47], [48].”
- Invariant Risk Minimization Games (2020, background): “There are different strategies in the literature to compute the equilibrium, such as best response dynamics (BRD) and fictitious play [4], but none of these strategies are guaranteed to arrive at equilibria in continuous games except for special classes of games [32, 33, 34, 35].”
- Convergence of a Relaxed Inertial Forward–Backward Algorithm for Structured Monotone Inclusions (2019, background): “An application to Nash equilibration with inertia A central question in game theory, decision sciences and economics is to describe realistic dynamics which converge to Nash equilibria, see [27] and the references therein.”
- Evolutionary game dynamics (2011, methodology): “This is shown using suitable Ljapunov functions [1,2,6].”