Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction

By ปิยดา สมบัติวัฒนา. 2013

775 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ae4bdb3e3cdf4b7a519ce4917b6877b9dea30ad1

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Citations in the corpus

Incomplete Contracts and Control (2017, background): “For example, 24 See, e.g., Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2003).”
“Last-Place Aversion”: Evidence and Redistributive Implications (2014, unknown): “which most players appear to be level 1 and Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2004), where”
Dissociable neural representations of reinforcement and belief prediction errors underlie strategic learning (2012, methodology): “It has long been recognized, however, that equilibria do not emerge spontaneously, but rather through some adaptive process whereby organisms evolve or learn over time, which cannot be accounted for by purely static equilibrium models (3).”
To Pay or Not to Pay: Competing Theories to Explain Individuals’ Willingness to Pay for Public Environmental Goods (2011, background): “They do not use every opportunity to free ride (see Camerer, 2003; Ledyard, 1995).”
A Survey of Learning in Multiagent Environments: Dealing with Non-Stationarity (2017, background): “For example, in the PD game (see Table 1) the Nash equilibrium occurs when both players play defect, however, many experiments have shown that people cooperate in similar situations (Camerer, 2003).”
NEUROBIOLOGY OF ECONOMIC CHOICE: A GOOD-BASED MODEL (2011, background): “…hold in normal circumstances, when preferences are stable and transitive, these neural properties may be violated in the presence of choice fallacies (Camerer 2003, Frederick et al. 2002, Kahneman & Tversky 2000, Tversky & Shafir 2004)—a promising topic for future research (Kalenscher et al. 2010).”
Search Dynamics in Consumer Choice under Time Pressure: An Eye-Tracking Study (2011, background): “…thinking in 1 Some behavioral economics models are more explicit about computational processes, such as “cognitive hierarchy” and level-k models in game theory (Camerer 2003; Nagel 1995) and similarity-based models (Ariel Rubinstein 1988). normal-form games (see also Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006).”
Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of other-regarding preferences across subject pools: evidence from one college student and two adult samples (2013, background): “Analogous evidence of the importance of otherregarding preferences has been documented by experimental studies using dictator games, bargaining games, trust games, and gift-exchange games (for reviews see, e.g., Camerer 2003; Fehr and Schmidt 2006).”
The Potential of Social Identity for Equilibrium Selection (2011, unknown): “by Roy Chen and Yan Chen Appendix”
A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences (2011, background): “See also Roth (1995) and Camerer (2003).”
Tribal Social Instincts and the Cultural Evolution of Institutions to Solve Collective Action Problems (2012, unknown): “Cultural evolution, founded on our sophisticated evolved capacities for social learning, spontaneously gives rise to social norms and institutions as individuals interact and learn.”
More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (2013, unknown): “Here we refrain from reviewing the large literature on dictator giving (see Roth, 1995, and Camerer, 2003, for reviews).”