The Financial Economics of Privatization
By W. Megginson. 2005
328 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Finance, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ae46f09693fe9143b2450c519f8c4d67e77a5a15
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Finance
- Chen Lin
- Antoinette Schoar
- Reggy Hooghiemstra
- Paula M. G. van Veen-Dirks
- Ronny Prabowo
- Frank M. Song
- Ping Lin
- Aldo Musacchio
In Strategy and Management
- Aldo Musacchio
- Ruth V. Aguilera
- Sérgio Giovanetti Lazzarini
- Chen Lin
- Mike Wright
- Jonathan P. Doh
- Reggy Hooghiemstra
- Paula M. G. van Veen-Dirks
Citations in the corpus
- State capitalism in international context: Varieties and variations (2020, background): “According to Megginson (2005); p.11), the “ economic and industrial mobilization that occurred during World War II dramatically increased the power (and prestige) of national governments as economic managers.”
- New Varieties of State Capitalism: Strategic and Governance Implications (2015, background): “Gupta (2005), for instance, found that listing and selling minority stakes to private investors increased the performance of SOEs in India compared to non-listed firms wholly owned by the state (for a review see Megginson, 2005, pp. 106–107).”
- Privatization and Stock Market Liquidity (2007, unknown): “Our research is related to the vast literature on the effects of privatization on financial market development (see Megginson, 2005 for an excellent survey).”
- State ownership reinvented? Explaining performance differences between state‐owned and private firms (2018, unknown): “Consistent with these predictions, empirical work has detected performance gains in the transition from state to private ownership (see for a review Megginson, 2005).”
- State Ownership, Socio-political Factors, and Labor Cost Stickiness (2018, background): “It is thus likely that SOEs pursue broader social objectives than private firms do, such as employing a large number of people to reduce unemployment rates (Bai et al., 2000; Megginson, 2005).”
- State Ownership, Soft-Budget Constraints, and Cash Holdings: Evidence from China's Privatized Firms (2014, unknown): “Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter (1999) study share-issue privatization programs in 59 countries and find evidence of continued political interventions.”
- The Decision to Privatize: Finance and Politics (2011, background): “…firms to private owners has yielded more than $1 trillion in revenues for governments, improved the performance of government-owned firms, and facilitated the development of financial markets.1 Yet, governments still own a substantial number of firms across the world (Megginson (2005)).”
- Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China (2010, background): “…or sometimes adverse innovative incentives to improve firm competitiveness, since as public employees, they cannot personally reap the benefits of increasing competitiveness, yet they will bear many of the costs of the R&D (e.g., uncertainty of the investment and angry workers) (Megginson, 2005).”
- Firm Profitability, State Ownership, and Top Management Turnover at the Listed Firms in China: A Behavioral Perspective (2009, unknown): “explanation for these findings is that privatization improves corporate governance quality in that private owners make managers more accountable for firm profitability than government bureaucrats (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Megginson, 2005).”
- The effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation: Evidence from Chinese listed firms (2017, background): “Managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have weak incentives to enhance firms’ competitiveness through innovation as these public employees cannot privatize the profits but have to bear the costs of R&D, such as innovation risks and outraged laid-off workers (Megginson, 2005).”
- Equity retention and social network theory in equity crowdfunding (2016, unknown): “This goal is in line with the literature on public offers, where, everything else equal, existing shareholders value the entry of a dispersed set of shareholders more than they value blockholders (Megginson 2005).”