Property rights protection and corporate R&D: Evidence from China

By Chen Lin, Ping Lin, Frank M. Song. 2010

297 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Following the recent literature on institutions and economic growth, we examine the effects of property rights protection on corporate RD (2) government services and helping hand are conducive to corporate RD and (3) government ownership of firms and direct appointment of CEOs are negatively associated with corporate R&D activities. We also find that corporate R&D is positively related to firm size, and access to finance, but negatively related to product market competition and firm age.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6459dc694501b58fd452990069e73e4bb35e1731

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Jun-xue Jia
2. Qinyuan Chen
3. Zhaozi Rong
4. Xiaokai Wu
5. Guangrong Ma
6. Kam C. Chan
7. Nianhang Xu
8. Yan Xu

In Economics and Econometrics

1. Zhaozi Rong
2. Xiaokai Wu
3. Jun-xue Jia
4. Guangrong Ma
5. Kam C. Chan
6. Nianhang Xu
7. Yan Xu
8. P. Boeing

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Jun-xue Jia
2. Qinyuan Chen
3. Guangrong Ma
4. Kam C. Chan
5. Nianhang Xu
6. Yan Xu

Citations in the corpus

• Ownership Structure and the Cost of Corporate Borrowing (2011, unknown): “If the endogeneity problem is specific to firms, but not industries or locations, then netting out this firm-specific component yields a wedge measure that only depends on the underlying characteristics inherent to particular industries or locations (Lin et al., 2009).”
• Do R&D tax incentives work? Firm-level evidence from China (2017, background): “A large body of literature has found that SOEs tend to be less innovative (see Choi, Lee, &Williams, 2011; Hu & Jefferson, 2009; Lin et al., 2010; Qian & Xu, 1998; Shleifer, 1998).”
• Political uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China (2016, methodology): “Following the literature (e.g., Cull and Xu, 2005; Ayyagari et al., 2010; Lin et al., 2010; Becker et al., 2011), we classified the city where a firm belonged according to the location of the firm’s corporate headquarters.”
• The effect of institutional ownership on firm innovation: Evidence from Chinese listed firms (2017, background): “There has been evidence consistent with Megginson’s (2005) argument that SOE managers have weak incentives to innovate (e.g., Hu and Jefferson, 2009; Lin et al., 2010; Boeing et al., 2016).”