Employee Stock Options

By Warren E. Buffett, Michael J. Mauboussin. 2004

129 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms (2003, background): “DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) find the approval of executive stock option plans 8 This occurs because the principal is unable to determine whether the correct action has been taken given the manager's private information.”
The Impact of Corporate Governance on Executive Compensation (2008, unknown): “Huddart (1994), for example, shows that early exercise is in fact optimal for a risk-averse investor.”
Implications for GAAP from an Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting (2010, methodology): “99 Huddart et al. (1999) model stock exchanges competing on disclosure requirements and find that such a setup can result in a ‘‘race to the top’’ even”
Incentives, Targeting and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-Executive Stock Options (2010, unknown): “13 We note that this estimate may overstate true costs to the firm since corporate insiders have been shown to exercise options early and also because these options are often illiquid (Huddart 1994; Hemmer, Matsunaga, and Shevlin 1996; Bettis, Bizjak, and Lemmon 2005).”