Evidence of jointness in the terms of relationship lending

By Ivan E. Brick, Darius N Palia. 2007

267 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ac981e86880faf8aff0c3556d35cee2a1631987b

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Tensie Steijvers
2. L. Gambacorta
3. Wim Voordeckers
4. Lars Norden
5. Steven R. G. Ongena
6. Allen N. Berger
7. R. Banerjee
8. J. Grunert

In Economics and Econometrics

1. L. Gambacorta
2. Steven R. G. Ongena
3. R. Banerjee
4. Allen N. Berger
5. Enrico Sette
6. J. Grunert
7. Lars Norden
8. Rajdeep Sengupta

In Finance

1. L. Gambacorta
2. Steven R. G. Ongena
3. Allen N. Berger
4. Lars Norden
5. Wim Voordeckers
6. Tensie Steijvers
7. R. Banerjee
8. J. Grunert

Citations in the corpus

• 'Time for a Change': Loan Conditions and Bank Behavior when Firms Switch Banks (2010, background): “may bias the findings ( Brick, Kane and Palia (2004) ; Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2006);”
• The Real Effects of Relationship Lending (2017, background): “Berger and Udell (1995), Brick and Palia (2007), and Bharath et al (2011) find that relationship banks charge a lower interest rate than transactional banks, but Degryse and Ongena (2005), and Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) show that interest rates increase with the duration of the relationship.”
• Bargaining power and information in SME lending (2010, background): “In particular, the literature (theory and empirical work) is not conclusive about whether contracted loan spreads and collateral work in the same or opposite direction (e.g., Dennis et al. 2000; Brick and Palia 2007).”
• Foreign Entry and Bank Competition (2006, background): “on pre-loan credit analysis reveals that commercial lenders require the observably risky borrowers to pledge more collateral (Orgler 1970, Scott and Smith 1986, Berger and Udell 1990, 1992, 1995, Brick et al., 2005 ).”
• Collateral, relationship lending and family firms (2010, methodology): “Berger and Udell 1995; Harhoff and Ko ¨rting 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000; Chakraborty and Hu 2006 ;J imenez et al. 2006; Brick and Palia 2007 ), as theoretically predicted by the model of Boot and Thakor (1994).”
• Do banks price discriminate spatially? Evidence from small business lending in local credit markets (2013, unknown): “The result contrasts arguments advanced by Boot and Thakor (1994), Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), Chakraborty and Hu (2006), Brick and Palia (2007) and Sakai et al. (2010).”
• COLLATERAL AND CREDIT RATIONING: A REVIEW OF RECENT EMPIRICAL STUDIES AS A GUIDE FOR FUTURE RESEARCH (2009, unknown): “The majority of results of previous studies confirms that relationship duration and collateral pledging can be considered as substitutes (e.g. Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and Körting, 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Chakraborty and Hu, 2006; Jiménez et al., 2006; Brick and Palia, 2007; Ste”
• Bank size, lending technologies, and small business finance (2011, result): “The collateral literature has found different results when using outside collateral versus inside collateral (e.g., John et al., 2003; Brick and Palia, 2007).”
• Lending to small businesses: the role of loan maturity in addressing information problems (2008, unknown): “However, the evidence on their effect on borrowing costs is mixed (Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell 1995; Cole 1998; Angelini et al. 1998; Harhoff and Körting 1998; Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000; Brick et al. 2004).”