'Time for a Change': Loan Conditions and Bank Behavior when Firms Switch Banks
By Vasso Ioannidou, Steven R. G. Ongena. 2010
352 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/32d87870395895b8abaaf6422aab2c838859a19f
Citations in the corpus
- Deposit Insurance and Bank Risk-Taking : Evidence from Internal Loan Ratings (2008, neutral): “14 Ioannidou and Ongena (2008), who use this database for the first time, provide detail information about firm composition by industry, size, legal structure and number of bank-firm relationships.”
- Why Do Firms Form New Banking Relationships (2011, neutral): “Using a detailed data set of Bolivian loans, Ioannidou and Ongena show that borrowers switch to new banks mainly to obtain a lower rate on their loans; however, once the borrower is informationally locked in with the new bank, the new bank charges a higher interest rate. Our paper differs from these”
- Does credit reporting lead to a decline in relationship lending? Evidence from information sharing technology (2018, neutral): “Indeed, when firms switch lenders, their new contract tends to resemble, in size and other terms, their old one (Ioannidou and Ongena 2010).”
- The cost of growth: small firms and the pricing of bank loans (2015, neutral): “However, after a while, firms are charged the same price that they should have paid if they had stayed with their initial bank (Ioannidou and Ongena 2010) or an even higher price to compensate the early subsidies (Kim et al.”
- Some Borrowers Are More Equal than Others: Bank Funding Shocks and Credit Reallocation* (2019, neutral): “, Sapienza, 2002; Focarelli and Panetta, 2003; Degryse, Masschelein, and Mitchell, 2011), or borrower lock-in (Ioannidou and Ongena, 2010).”