The Order of Encryption and Authentication for Protecting Communications (or: How Secure Is SSL?)
By Hugo Krawczyk. Annual International Cryptology Conference, 2001
454 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Computer Networks and Communications
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/abb39b98016e1809019245dd0a9d5a7e8473a710
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Artificial Intelligence
- Dan Boneh
- Brent Waters
- Mihir Bellare
- Ran Canetti
- Yevgeniy Dodis
- Hugo Krawczyk
- Jesper Buus Nielsen
- Jonathan Katz
In Computer Networks and Communications
- Jesper Buus Nielsen
- Hugo Krawczyk
- Dan Boneh
- Yevgeniy Dodis
- Ran Canetti
- Tal Rabin
- Mihir Bellare
- Serge Vaudenay
Citations in the corpus
- Analysis of Key-Exchange Protocols and Their Use for Building Secure Channels (2001, result): “One particularly interesting aspect of our work is highlighted by recent results in [ 25 ] where it is demonstrated that the specific ordering of encryption and authentication as applied here is instrumental for achieving secure channels (if one assumes the standard strength, i.e.”
- OCB: a block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption (2001, unknown): “(Analyses of these methods are provided in [7] [24].)”
- Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding - Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS (2002, methodology): “As an example, Krawczyk [11] recently demonstrated the security of the authenticate-then-CBC-encrypt scheme.”
- FHIRChain: Applying Blockchain to Securely and Scalably Share Clinical Data (2018, background): “To overcome the limitation with public blockchains, FHIRChain protects the shared content via a secure cryptographic mechanism called “sign then encrypt” [42].”
- An efficient public-key searchable encryption scheme secure against inside keyword guessing attacks (2017, background): “In this sense it could be viewed as a public-key variant of authenticated encryption [26].”
- SIGMA: The 'SIGn-and-MAc' Approach to Authenticated Diffie-Hellman and Its Use in the IKE-Protocols (2003, methodology): “CBC) can be used with a MAC function computed on top of the ciphertext [3, 23].”
- Authenticated Encryption: Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic Composition Paradigm (2000, background): “Generic Composition Canetti and Krawczyk [21] show that EtM implements a “secure channel,” and Krawczyk [40] shows that E&M and MtE in general do not.”
- Key Homomorphic PRFs and Their Applications (2013, background): “Symmetric-key proxy re-encryption built from key homomorphic PRFs elegantly solves a common problem facing companies who store encrypted data in the cloud.”
- Analysis of an electronic voting system (2004, methodology): “This CRC is then stored along with the ciphertext in the file and verified whenever the data is decrypted and read.”
- Architecture for protecting critical secrets in microprocessors (2005, background): “This sequence of encryption-then-hash has been proven secure in [15].”
- Introduction to Modern Cryptography, Second Edition (2014, unknown): “Krawczyk [108] examines other methods for achieving secrecy and authentication, and also analyzes the authenticate-then-encrypt approach used by SSL.”
- The Galois/Counter Mode of Operation (GCM) (2005, background): “Defining a mode using generic composition (encrypt-then-authenticate [15]) is a simple way to achieve a provably secure mode of operation, as long as the underlying components for encryption and authentication are provably secure.”
- Relaxing Chosen-Ciphertext Security (2003, background): “The reader can verify that the notion of pd-RCCA is essentially equivalent to the notions of loose ciphertext-unforgeability, benign malleability, and generalized CCA security, presented, respectively, in [19,24,1].”
- FPGA Intrinsic PUFs and Their Use for IP Protection (2007, background): “We refer to [5] (see also [23]) for the details but notice that the third construction is the one that provides the strongest security guarantees.”
- Formal Proofs for the Security of Signcryption (2002, methodology): “Krawczyk [14] considered the same problem while examining how to build secure channels over insecure networks.”
- On the Security of Joint Signature and Encryption (2002, methodology): “On the other hand, we show that in the weaker Outsider-security model, it is possible to amplify the security of encryption using signatures, as well as the security of signatures using encryption, exactly like in the symmetric setting [5, 22, 1].”