Scalable, graph-based network vulnerability analysis

By Paul Ammann, Duminda Wijesekera, Saket Kaushik. Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 2002

899 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Information Systems, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a9a975a582315e917a86bd2e3a3a81c4fe3a401a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Computer Networks and Communications

1. Xinming Ou
2. Ludovic Piètre-Cambacédès
3. Barbara Kordy
4. Patrick Schweitzer
5. Sushil Jajodia
6. Miles A. McQueen
7. Wayne F. Boyer
8. A. Appel

In Information Systems

1. Ludovic Piètre-Cambacédès
2. Barbara Kordy
3. Patrick Schweitzer
4. Xinming Ou
5. Brian O'Berry
6. Steven Noel
7. Kun Sun
8. Sushil Jajodia

In Signal Processing

1. Ludovic Piètre-Cambacédès
2. Barbara Kordy
3. Patrick Schweitzer
4. Sushil Jajodia
5. Peng Ning
6. Xinming Ou
7. Miles A. McQueen
8. Wayne F. Boyer

Citations in the corpus

• MulVAL: A Logic-based Network Security Analyzer (2005, background): “There is a long line of work on network vulnerability analysis [27, 25, 23, 24, 1, 17].”
• Dynamic Security Risk Management Using Bayesian Attack Graphs (2012, background): “A number of researchers have proposed risk assessment methods by building security models of network systems, using paradigms like attack graphs [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] and attack trees [6], [7], [8], [9], and then finding attack paths in these models to determine scenarios that could lead to damage”
• Efficient minimum-cost network hardening via exploit dependency graphs (2003, methodology): “In comparison to the original examples in [3] and [10], one may notice that some exploit preconditions are missing.”
• NICE: Network Intrusion Detection and Countermeasure Selection in Virtual Network Systems (2013, background): “[11] introduced the assumption of monotonicity, which states that the precondition of a given exploit is never invalidated by the successful application of another exploit.”
• How to misuse AODV: a case study of insider attacks against mobile ad-hoc routing protocols (2003, background): “We do not consider such compound misuses in this paper.”
• A scalable approach to attack graph generation (2006, methodology): “Our attack graph generation tool builds upon MulVAL, a net­work security analyzer based on logical programming.”
• DAG-based attack and defense modeling: Don't miss the forest for the attack trees (2013, background): “[179] restricted the graphs by exploiting a monotony property, thereby eliminating backtracking in terms of privilege escalation.”