DAG-based attack and defense modeling: Don't miss the forest for the attack trees
By Barbara Kordy, Ludovic Piètre-Cambacédès, Patrick Schweitzer. Computer Science Review, 2013
352 citations recorded by the source corpus.
This paper presents the current state of the art on attack and defense modeling approaches that are based on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). DAGs allow for a hierarchical decomposition of complex scenarios into simple, easily understandable and quantifiable actions. Methods based on threat trees and Bayesian networks are two well-known approaches to security modeling. However there exist more than 30 DAG-based methodologies, each having different features and goals. The objective of this survey is to summarize the existing methodologies, compare their features, and propose a taxonomy of the described formalisms. This article also supports the selection of an adequate modeling technique depending on user requirements.
Subfields: Computer Networks and Communications, Information Systems, Software
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/c9e15b24791429402e4abe1a7420eedfae048c36
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In Computer Networks and Communications
In Information Systems
In Software
Citations in the corpus
- Fault tree analysis: A survey of the state-of-the-art in modeling, analysis and tools (2014, neutral): “[106].”
- A survey of approaches combining safety and security for industrial control systems (2015, background): “Fault trees have been used for a long time in safety risk analysis, while attack trees, although younger and diverse, are gaining momentum in security modeling [112].”