Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces

By Ronald Kneebone, K. Mckenzie. 2001

234 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a89434c8416cb50154301b89b1d86e6c3949a65f

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Economics and Econometrics

1. A. Alesina
2. Eric Dubois
3. Niklas Potrafke
4. Andréa Stella
5. M. Eslava
6. Eva Mörk
7. M. Dahlberg
8. Allan Drazen

In Political Science and International Relations

1. Niklas Potrafke
2. Eric Dubois
3. A. Alesina
4. Andréa Stella
5. M. Eslava
6. Allan Drazen
7. M. Dahlberg
8. M. Foucault

Citations in the corpus

• Is There an Election Cycle in Public Employment? Separating Time Effects from Election Year Effects (2011, methodology): “…Nadeau, 1992, and Pettersson- Lidbom, 2003), spending on different categories (see, e.g., Andrikopoulos et al., 2004, Blais and Nadeau, 1992, and Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001), tax rates (see, e.g., Andrikopoulos et al,. 2004, Kneebone and McKenzie, 2001, and Pettersson-Lidbom, 2003), and…”
• Political Budget Cycles: Evidence from Italian Cities (2017, unknown): “…that electoral budget cycles affect the composition of local budgets.6 Evidence of local political budget cycles is also found by Reid (1998) and Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) for Canadian provinces, and by Drazen and Eslava (2010) for Colombia.7 Foremny and Riedel (2014) document evidence of…”
• Public expenditures in Canadian provinces: An empirical study of politico-economic interactions (2006, unknown): “Although some studies do support both explanations (Swank, 1992; Van Dalen & Swank, 1996; Dickson & Yu, 1997; Kneebone & McKenzie, 2001 ), most reject one or both explanations (Golden & Poterba, 1980; Alt & Chrystal, 1981; Griffin, Devine, & Wallace, 1983; Browning, 1985; Lewis-Beck & Rice, 370”
• Political Budget Cycles in New Versus Established Democracies (2005, unknown): “A number of recent papers (Shi and Svensson [2002a,b], Persson and Tabellini [2002]) find evidence confirming the widespread existence of a political deficit cycle in aggregate data.”
• Conditional political budget cycles: a review of recent evidence (2013, unknown): “…but not governmental investment expenditures, and use this information to form inferences increases in spending categories that are visible and easily targeted, such as construction of roads and physical structures (Gonzales 2002; Kneebone and McKenzie 2001; Drazen and Eslava 2006, 2010).”
• Public spending interactions and local politics. Empirical evidence from French municipalities (2008, background): “In this perspective, Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) found no evidence of a political budget cycle for Canadian provinces with respect to aggregate spending.”
• Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence (2010, background): “…to capital) expenditures, but is weaker if investment in roads, an important component of public investment, is included in his policy variable.4 Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) look for evidence of a political budget cycle for Canadian provinces, and nd no evidence of a cycle in aggregate…”
• Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies? (2010, unknown): “A later study of Kneebone and McKenzie (2001) Public Choice”
• The Politics of Monetary Policy (2010, background): “2 b(2)+b[ y+b t+ t] f 1 2 [ t( i t)] (2)+b[ y+ t( i t) t+ t]g (71)”
• Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries (2010, background): “Scholars have investigated how government ideology has influenced the composition ofpublicexpendituresatthestatelevelinfederalstatessuchasCanada(e.g., Kneebone and McKenzie 2001 ) or Germany (e.g., Potrafke 2011a).”
• Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus (2016, background): “…studies investigate PBCs in several spending components to discriminate those privileged by the incumbent: for example, van Dalen and Swank (1996), Kneebone and McKenzie (2001), Galli and Rossi (2002), Serritzlew (2005), Veiga and Veiga (2007a, 2007b), Vergne (2009), Drazen and Eslava (2010),…”
• Pork Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953-1994 (2008, unknown): “diverse as Albania (Case 2001), Argentina (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Porto and Sanguinetti 2001), Australia (Denemark 2000; Worthington and Dollery 1998), Brazil (Ames 2001), Canada (Kneebone and McKenzie 2001), Colombia (Crisp and Ingall 2002) England (Ward and John 1999; John and Ward 2001), France ”