Dishonesty and the handicap principle

By Rufus A. Johnstone, A. Grafen. 1993

Subfields: Game & Decision Theory, Computational Biology & Bioinformatics

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Citations in the corpus

Alignment of Language Agents (2021, background): “As discussed by Krakovna et al. (2020b) we are still at the early stages of finding solution approaches for objective gaming.”
Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment (2011, background): “Because signalers and receivers have partially competing interests, inferior signalers have incentive to “cheat,” intentionally producing false signals so that receivers will select them (Johnstone & Grafen 1993).”
Low-amplitude song predicts attack in a North American wood warbler (2010, background): “…are expected to be reliable, on average, because otherwise receivers would evolve to not respond to them and communication systems would break down (Johnstone & Grafen 1993; reviewed in Maynard Smith & Harper 2003; Searcy & Nowicki 2005). rganismic and Evolutionary assachusetts, Amherst, MA dy of…”
Territorial vocal rallying in the green woodhoopoe: influence of rival group size and composition (2003, unknown): “Bond 1989; Johnstone & Grafen 1993; Adams & Mesterton-Gibbons 1995).”
Genotype–environment interaction and the reliability of mating signals (2004, background): “In terms of perfection, signal characteristics are expected to be reliable to the extent that an ‘ideal receiver’, one suffering no perceptual impairments, can respond in a manner that on average enhances its fitness (see Johnstone & Grafen 1993).”
Sexual signaling in the European bitterling: females learn the truth by direct inspection of the resource (2001, background): “This is especially likely because male traits may be subjected to some cheating even in a stable system ( Johnstone and Grafen, 1993), whereas the quality of the resource may be difficult to disguise.”
Male green frogs lower the pitch of acoustic signals in defense of territories: a possible dishonest signal of size? (2000, background): “…empirical evidence of its occurrence, several models have been developed to show that the use of dishonest signals can be stable in a population, especially if they occur at low frequencies (e.g., Adams and Mesterton-Gibbons, 1995; Bond, 1989; Gardner and Morris, 1989; Johnstone and Grafen, 1993).”
Primate Rituals: The Function of Greetings between Male Guinea Baboons (2003, background): “One relatively well-accepted view in the field of animal communication is that costly signals are more difficult to fake than cheap signals, and therefore more likely to convey honest information about the sender (Zahavi 1975, 1977a; Grafen 1990; Johnstone & Grafen 1993; Hauser 1996).”
Vocal performance influences female response to male bird song: an experimental test (2004, background): “For a trait to be an accurate indicator of male quality, there must be some cost involved in producing that trait which ensures its honesty (Grafen, 1990; Johnstone and Grafen, 1993).”
A strategic taxonomy of biological communication (2005, unknown): “The signal used by females in the H state may be said to be ‘dishonest’ (sensu Johnstone & Grafen 1993), because the response is consistently to the female’s benefit and to the detriment of the male.”
The use of multiple cues in mate choice (2003, background): “Some degree of dishonesty is expected in stable signalling systems (Dawkins & Guilford, 1991; Johnstone & Grafen, 1993; Johnstone, 1994) and can be promoted by factors such as individual differences in costs of signalling.”