Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs

By Robert M. Daines, M. Klausner. 2001

225 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a6bc081c9db20a4c0e2f5a9cb46b257ddd4a21b5

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Citations in the corpus

Rating the Ratings: How Good are Commercial Governance Ratings? (2010, background): “For example, Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny (1988) consider managerial ownership, Daines and Klausner (2001) examine takeover defenses, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) analyze the consequences of busy boards, Coles, Naveen, and Naveen (2008) consider board size, and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007)…”
The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation (2010, unknown): “Daines and Klausner (2001) find that anti-takeover provisions (e.g., including staggered board) are common in the charters for initial public offerings, and conclude that these choices are most consistent with managerial entrenchment.”
Venture Capitalists, Business Angels, and Performance of Entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France (2007, unknown): “In fact, Klausner and Daines (2001) find that anti-takeover provisions are common in IPO-stage charters, and allow to save the private benefits of control.”
Venture Capital and Corporate Governance in the Newly Public Firm (2012, unknown): “IPOs, which Klausner and Daines (2002) suggest may have more entrenching governance structures”
Why Do Public Firms Issue Private and Public Securities? (2012, unknown): “We follow the approach used by Daines and Klausner (2001) to build a corporate governance measure.”
The Role of Corporate Governance in Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts (2008, background): “They ﬁnd no relation between the initialvaluation pro-visions (as in Daines and Klausner [2001], Field and Karpoff [2002], and Smart and Zutter [2003]), or the board (as in Baker and Gompers [2003]).”
Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance (2007, methodology): “One provision that is commonly used in prior work is blank check preferred (e.g., Daines and Klausner 2001).”
Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners (2016, background): “Passive institutions might also care about overall performance if they are a pension fund that needs to fund a pension liability (Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999)).”
Earnings and dividend informativeness when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights (2005, background): “and proxy contests ( Daines and Klausner [2001] ; Field and Karpoff [2002]).”
Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control (2008, unknown): “Daines and Klausner (2001) also reason that board classification has “no justification except to ward off challenges for control.””