Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance
By David F. Larcker, Scott A. Richardson. 2007
1,514 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4c24860564f05df1b437d74d72814e8fe8d89945
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- David F. Larcker
- Terry Shevlin
- Shivaram Rajgopal
- Nemit Shroff
- Qiang Cheng
- Weili Ge
- W. Guay
In Strategy and Management
- Shivaram Rajgopal
- Terry Shevlin
- Christopher S. Armstrong
- Qiang Cheng
- Weili Ge
- K. Hussainey
- Sarah E. McVay
- Ahsan Habib
Citations in the corpus
- CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A SURVEY (2016, positive): “Larcker et al. (2007) investigate a sample of 2106 financial and non-financial firms between 2002 and 2003 and use principal component analysis to develop 14 multi-indicator indices from 39 individual governance indicators, including CEO duality.”
- Form versus Substance: The Implications for Auditing Practice and Research of Alternative Perspectives on Corporate Governance (2008, methodology): “For example, using an agency framework it is difficult to establish causal links between measures of governance quality and the performance of the firm (Larcker et al. 2007) and to ascertain whether an active audit committee truly exerts an independent influence on governance.”
- The Effect of Mandatory IFRS Adoption on Real and Accrual-Based Earnings Management Activities (2014, neutral): “(Larcker et al., 2007).”
- Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections (2009, neutral): “(2006), and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007).”
- Do Financial Restatements Lead to Auditor Changes (2013, background): “However, Larcker et al. (2007) document that accounting restatements are not related to governance proxies that include board characteristics, stock ownership of insiders, institutional ownership, activist stockownership, executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables.”
- Aggregated, Voluntary and Mandatory Risk Disclosure Incentives: Evidence from UK FTSE All Share Companies (2013, background): “NOSH_ Factor is the average of two-principal factors (e.g., Larcker et al., 2007) that combine four types of shares.”
- Corporate governance and firm performance and value in Saudi Arabia (2012, methodology): “FOUR_MEET is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s board met at least four times in a single year, otherwise equal to zero. favorable to Saudi firms, Larcker et al. (2007) report only 23% of U.S. firms separate the role of the CEO and COB.”
- Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting (2012, neutral): “…the results.10 The analysis is on a small sample and uses crude proxies for monitoring that may or may not capture the sorts of governance mechanisms that would detect and prevent misstatements (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; Armstrong, Guay, and Weber, 2010; Brickley and Zimmerman, 2010).”
- Stock price crash risk: review of the empirical literature (2018, positive): “Corporate governance attributes have an important role on financial disclosure and reporting quality (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna 2007).”
- Internal Governance and Real Earnings Management (2016, background): “To represent the strength of other governance mechanisms, we recognize that there are a number of governance measures which are highly correlated with each other and that it is an empirical challenge to find one single measure that represents the overall governance (Larcker et al. 2008).”
- Corporate Governance and Performance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: Evidence from US Commercial Banks (2011, methodology): “Moreover, similar to Larcker et al. (2007), our findings call for more research adopting theories different from agency theory, which appears to have partial explanatory power in investigating performance implications of corporate governance at banks.”