Effects of Large Shareholding on Information Asymmetry and Stock Liquidity

By Najah Attig, Wai-Ming Fong, Yoser Gadhoum, Larry H. P. Lang. 2006

295 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a658ce345701221f67c582725703e04919b609ab

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Citations in the corpus

Large controlling shareholders and stock price synchronicity (2014, unknown): “Moreover, numerous studies provide evidence that the control–ownership wedge shapes the corporate information environment (Fan and Wong, 2002; Haw et al., 2004; Attig et al., 2006).”
The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy: The Global Financial Crisis, Family Control, and Dividend Policy (2016, unknown): “On the other hand, prior empirical evidence (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Fan and Wong, 2002; Barth, Gulbrandsen, and Schone, 2005; Attig et al., 2006; Boubakri.”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, unknown): “In addition to these arguments, prior theory (e.g., Almeida and Wolfenzon 2006) and evidence (e.g., Attig et al. 2006; Boubakri et al. 2010; Claessens et al. 2002) shows that family-controlled firms are associated with more pronounced agency costs.”
Corporate Governance and Liquidity (2010, unknown): “Similarly, Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Karamanou and 3 Attig et al. (2006) show that poor information disclosure by self-serving owners reduces stock market liquidity using a sample of Canadian stocks.”
Does the board of directors affect cash holdings? A study of French listed firms (2013, unknown): “Such ownership structures indeed favor a relatively high information asymmetry, allowing the controlling shareholders to conceal their egregious actions from other shareholders (Attig et al. 2006).”
Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity (2008, background): “(2004)), higher liquidity costs and asymmetric information (Attig et al. (2006)), and influences the quality of financial reporting (Fan and Wong (2005), El Ghoul et al. (2007)).”
Excess Control, Corporate Governance and Implied Cost of Equity: International Evidence (2009, unknown): “…Roell (1999) and Faccio and Lang (2002) on Continental Europe, Khanna and Palepu (1999) on India, Claessens et al. (2000) on East Asian countries, Attig et al. (2006) and Morck et al. (2000) on Canada, Wiwattanakantang (2001) on Thailand, Yeh et al. (2001) on Taiwan, Joh (2003) on South Korea,…”