Excess Control, Corporate Governance and Implied Cost of Equity: International Evidence

By Omrane Guedhami, Dev R. Mishra. 2009

120 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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Citations in the corpus

Multiple large shareholders, excess leverage and tunneling: evidence from an emerging market (2017, unknown): “pivotal monitoring role in curbing the extraction of private benefits (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). On the other hand, Zwiebel (1995) and Gomes and Novaes (2005) raise doubt about the efficient monitoring role of multiple large shareholders, and their model contends that the concentration of cont”
The dark side of CEO ability: CEO general managerial skills and cost of equity capital☆ (2014, unknown): “However, theoretical predictions of these variables are consistent with the larger implied cost of equity literature (e.g., Gode and Mohanram, 2003; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 2009).”
Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity (2008, result): “Our study complements also Guedhami and Mishra (2007), who document a positive relation between the cost of equity capital and the largest shareholder’s excess control, by showing that MLS can play an important monitoring role by moderating the governance and information”
Corporate Environmental Responsibility and the Cost of Capital: International Evidence (2016, background): “A higher dispersion means wider disagreement among analysts, which implies greater uncertainty about the forecasted earnings (Guedhami and Mishra 2009).”
Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital (2011, background): “, 2009a,b), and ownership structure (Attig et al., 2008; Guedhami and Mishra, 2009; Boubakri et al., 2010), and has also been used in event studies that examine cross-listings (Hail and Leuz, 2009) and earnings restatements (Hirbar and Jenkins, 2004).”
The governance role of multiple large shareholders: evidence from the valuation of cash holdings (2011, unknown): “(1999), among others, we use ownership rights (OWN1) to control for an owner’s incentives to increase firm value, and voting rights in excess of ownership rights (VOTEMOWN1) to control for the entrenchment effect of the largest shareholder (Guedhami and Mishra 2009; Laeven and Levine 2008).”
Family control and the implied cost of equity: Evidence before and after the Asian financial crisis (2010, background): “10Appendices in Hail and Leuz (2006) and Guedhami and Mishra (2009) provide a detailed description of the four models, including their assumptions and data requirements.”
Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, unknown): “Finally, corporate governance literature points out the significance of legal institutions in limiting expropriation of firms in countries with strong legal institutions associated with higher valuation and lower financing costs (La Porta et al., 1997; Hail and Leuz, 2006; Guedhami and Mishra, 2007)”