The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy
By Philip E. Keefer, D. Stasavage. American Political Science Review, 2003
575 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a65220b9a8dd7e63529b648dfe24e5e4d836db34
How researchers see this paper
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In Economics and Econometrics
- Anke Hoeffler
- Georgios Efthyvoulou
- Paul Collier
- Peter Nunnenkamp
- Philip E. Keefer
- Paul M. Vaaler
- Axel Dreher
- Andreas Fuchs
In Finance
- Georgios Efthyvoulou
- Andreas Fuchs
- Paul Collier
- Zheying Wu
- Robert Salomon
- Anke Hoeffler
- Fabrizio Gilardi
- Axel Dreher
Citations in the corpus
- Testing the neocon agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies (2009, methodology): “by a measure used by Keefer and Stasavage (2004) termed ‘checks’.”
- Central Bank Independence and Transparency: Evolution and Effectiveness (2008, unknown): “For instance, the need for transparency may reflect public attitudes (Hayo, 1998), particular aspects of the political system (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003), or competing interest groups (Posen, 1993).”
- Political budget cycles in the European Union and the impact of political pressures (2011, methodology): “Information on each country’s election dates, forms of government, electoral rules, government fragmentation and government position on a left-right scale are retrieved from the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001; Keefer and Stasavage 2003 ), and complemented, where n”
- Counting the investor vote: political business cycle effects on sovereign bond spreads in developing countries (2005, methodology): “Beck et al. (2001) explain the decision rules used for these DPI categorizations, which are widely used in recent academic research for purposes of assessing the partisan orientation of political parties in industrialized and developing country contexts (e.g., Stasavage and Keefer, 2003 ).”
- Elections, Political Competition and Bank Failure (2014, background): “Evidence of the important role of veto players in economic policy making can be found in Keefer and Stasavage (2003), who study the role of veto players on the degree of central bank independence and subsequent credibility (i.”
- When Does Policy Reform Work?: The Case of Central Bank Independence (2008, unknown): “Keefer and Stasavage (2002, 2003).”
- Political Polarization as a Constraint on Corruption: A Cross-national Comparison (2011, methodology): “Although polarization can be measured in a number of different ways, we chose a measure that has been used in previous work (Keefer and Stasavage, 2003). The measure we use was constructed by Beck, et al. (2001) as follows.”