Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa

By Nathan M. Jensen, Léonard Wantchekon. 2004

729 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Building and Construction, Development, Economics and Econometrics

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a625bbbe9065d8d0e285bcbe327dfce02ee392ba

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Citations in the corpus

Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Resource Abundance, Dependence and the Onset of Civil Wars (2009, background): “On regime type (and institutions more broadly), refer to Karl (1997), Ross (2001), Leite and Weidmann (2002), Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) , and Bulte et al. (2005).”
Do natural resources matter for interstate and intrastate armed conflict? (2014, background): “In particular, it is argued that resource-rich countries have dysfunctional political and economic institutions (Ross, 2001; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Acemoglu & Robinson, 3 This is important because scarcity does not usually affect an entire country in the same way.”
Oil and Autocratic Regime Survival (2015, background): “…empirical literature on the resource curse does not separate cross-national correla- tions (between-country effects) from variation within countries (within-country effects) (e.g., Ross 2001; Smith 2004; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; Ulfelder 2007; Morrison 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010).”
Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change (2009, background): “…of examining how anticipated revolutionary threats shape resource reallocations, we propose and test an explanation of the effect of the resource curse (Gelb, 1988; Humphreys, 2005; Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Ross, 1999; Sachs & Warner, 2001) on endogenous shifts toward or away from democracy.”
Does Oil Wealth Affect Democracy in Africa (2014, background): “Drawing on the rentier state theory, the •political resource curse•literature argues that oil wealth entrenches autocracy and hinders democracy (Anderson, 1987; Beblawi and Luciani, 1987; Ross, 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004).”
Oil and political survival (2013, neutral): “[34] Jensen, N.”
Does migration promote democratization? Evidence from the Mexican transition (2012, background): “For the case of Africa, Jensen and Wantchekon (2004) show that the more important the natural resource sector is in a given country, the less likely it is to be a democracy.”
Aid Is Not Oil: Donor Utility, Heterogeneous Aid, and the Aid-Democratization Relationship (2015, background): “For example, see Acemoglu et al. 2008; Boix 2003; Dunning 2008; Epstein et al. 2006; Goldberg, Mvukiyehe, and Wibbels 2008; Haber and Menaldo 2011; Jensen and Wantchekon 2004; and Ramsay 2011.”