Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change

By B. D. de Mesquita, Alastair Smith. 2009

245 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Development, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/81ff81e14aeabdd9e232ed5f14cd74862aed441a

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Demography

1. Ruth Kricheli
2. Beatriz Magaloni
3. Eoin F. McGuirk
4. Zachary M. Jones
5. E. Olsen
6. Andreas Kotsadam
7. Michael K. Miller
8. Daniel W. Hill

In Development

1. Ruth Kricheli
2. Beatriz Magaloni
3. Eoin F. McGuirk
4. Zachary M. Jones
5. Andreas Kotsadam
6. Michael K. Miller
7. Håvard Mokleiv Nygård
8. Daniel W. Hill

In Sociology and Political Science

1. Andreas Kotsadam
2. Michael K. Miller
3. Ruth Kricheli
4. Beatriz Magaloni
5. Eoin F. McGuirk
6. Zachary M. Jones
7. E. Olsen
8. Håvard Mokleiv Nygård

Citations in the corpus

• An Empirical Evaluation of Explanations for State Repression (2014, methodology): “One study analyzing the Polity data found that the aggregated scale primarily reflects the executive constraints component (Gleditsch and Ward 1997),40 and studies of repression have found that the competition component of Polity is more strongly related to measures of repression than the other subc”
• Political Order and One-Party Rule (2010, background): “In the face of simultaneous threats to their stability from within the elites and from within the masses, choosing to distribute rents only to the elites is not an optimal strategy from the dictator’s perspective (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2009, Kricheli & Livne 2009).”
• Autocratic Elections: Stabilizing Tool or Force for Change? (2017, background): “Although different dictators can be motivated by different combinations of objectives (Wintrobe, 1998), a key goal for many, if not most, is to remain in power (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Thus, autocrats and their close allies will evaluate their actions and policy choices based on whether the”
• Elections, Information, and Policy Responsiveness in Autocratic Regimes (2015, background): “Desai, Olofsgård, and Yousef (2009) find that oil-rich countries spend more, but Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) find that they spend less.”
• Mining and Local Corruption in Africa (2017, background): “, Smith, 2004, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009; Cuaresma et al., 2011; Knutsen, 2014). Moreover, Ross (2001) suggests that natural resources enable “rentier states” that”
• The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability (2013, background): “Firstly, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) propose what could be construed as a competing hypothesis, whereby the response of leaders to revolutionary threats vary with the source of central revenues.”