The Might of the Pen: A Reputational Theory of Communication in International Disputes
By Anne E. Sartori. International Organization, 2002
227 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, Management Science and Operations Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a4c14f47aac6b5aa51bf8fd6baae8518d698c5aa
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In Management Science and Operations Research
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Citations in the corpus
- Politicians, the Media, and Domestic Audience Costs (2006, background): “Because of this, the foreign actor 4 Audience costs can be imposed by foreign actors (Sartori 2002).”
- Military Coercion in Interstate Crises (2005, background): “…crucially on the degree of antagonism between the actors (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Morrow 1994b).3 Following Schelling (1960), most 3 Reputational concerns due to continuing interaction with domestic (Guisinger and Smith 2002) or foreign (Sartori 2002) audiences may lend credibility to cheap talk.”
- Rationality and Psychology in International Politics (2005, background): “…a sheet of steel has a different effect+ Jervis, personal communication+ 69+ For example, Riker 1962, 7+ 70+ See respectively, Keohane 1984; Ostrom 1998; and Fearon 1995+ 71+ See Sartori 2002, 136; and Downs and Jones 2002, 101+ 72+ Jervis 1976+ 73+ Morrow 1994, 55, 219, 242+ a function, at least…”
- War, Peace, and the Invisible Hand: Positive Political Externalities of Economic Globalization (2003, background): “This controversy really hinges on one’s definition of 4 Reputation can make ‘‘cheap talk’’ credible (Sartori, 2002), though it also has perverse effects (Nalebuff, 1991).”
- Goliath's Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power (2010, background): “…that themselves influence bargaining leverage ~for example, Fearon 1997a!+ 27+ Examples of models that adopt some or all of these assumptions include Schultz 2001; Sartori 2002; and Reed 2003, among many others+ second assumption restricts the challenger from backing down once a threat is…”