The Political Economy of Institutions and Corruption in American States

By James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen. 2003

266 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a44ccb83160f1ab9182c9bdd38dfe3393f52fbe9

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Citations in the corpus

Does Political Corruption Impede Firm Innovation? Evidence from the United States (2019, background): “High incidences of corruption are also documented by Alt and Lassen (2003) and Glaeser and Saks (2006), among others.”
Corruption in America (2006, background): “Using a survey of state political reporters, Alt and Lassen (2003) find that states with greater political competition (as measured by open primaries and campaign expenditure restrictions) are associated with less corruption.”
Elections, Political Competition and Bank Failure (2014, unknown): “Theoretical studies, for example, by Barro (1973), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Ferejohn (1986), Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Aidt (2003), and Alt and Lassen (2003) conclude that political competition tends to ameliorate corrupt behavior.”
Illegal Trade in the Iranian Economy: Evidence from a Structural Model (2009, unknown): “(Treismann, 2000; Ali and Isse, 2003; Alt and Lassen, 2003; Rauch and Evan, 2000; to name a few).”
Corruption, Institutions, and Economic Development (2009, background): “, Alt and Lassen (2003) for a study of US states and Del Monte and Papagni (2001) for a study of Italian regions) and data on the amount of leakage from infrastructure projects in Italian regions (Golden and Picci, 2005).”
Measures of corruption and determinants of US corruption (2011, result): “As in some other studies ( Alt and Lassen 2003, 2008 ), greater economic prosperity ( IN Cpc) is shown to lower corruption perceptions.”
Electoral Incentives for Political Corruption under Open-List Proportional Representation (2005, unknown): “…current empirical research has attributed political corruption to a set of political and economic factors, including political accountability (Alt and Lassen 2003; Montinola and Jackman 2002; Rose-Ackerman 1999), political institutions (Gerring and Thacker 2004; Myerson 1993; Persson,…”
Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States (2013, unknown): “…Glaeser and Saks ( 2006 ) find in their sample an effect of about half of a standard deviation of a corresponding one-standard-deviation increase in education, a variable that has been consistently found to be ( negatively ) correlated with corruption ( Alt and Lassen 2003, Glaeser and Saks 2006 .”
A controlled field experiment on corruption (2011, background): “31In the empirical literature, van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), as well as Alt and Lassen (2003) nd a negative correlation between wages and corruption, while Rauch and Evans (2000), and Swamy et al. (2001) nd no support for this common hypothesis.”
Political and Judicial Checks on Corruption: Evidence from American State Governments (2007, unknown): “In addition to these variables, and their interaction, we include controls for a wide range of variables generally found to influence corruption and government quality (Alt and Lassen, 2003; Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Knack, 2002; Persson et al., 2003; Treisman, 2000): Metropolitan population, per capi”
THE DETERMINANTS OF CORRUPTION A Literature Survey and New Evidence (2006, background): “The first case is close to Frechette (2001) for schooling variable, but contradicts with Ali and Isse (2003), Alt and Lassen (2003), Brunetti and Weder (2003), Persson et al. (2003), Evan and Rauch (2000), Ades and di Tella (1997; 1999), and van Rijckeghem-Weder (1997).”
The economic effects of direct democracy—a first global assessment (2009, unknown): “states, Alt and Lassen (2003) find that initiative states have significantly lower levels of perceived corruption than non-initiative states. Pommerehne (1983, 1990) dealt with the effects of direct democracy on the efficiency with which government services are provided. More specifically, he found ”
Proposal for a New Measure of Corruption, Illustrated with Italian Data (2005, background): “Finally, in a spirit similar to our own, recent work moves away from survey measures altogether, adopting alternative micro-measures, such as procurement prices of publicly-purchased goods (Di Tella and Schargrodsky, 2003; see also McMillan, 1991) or prosecutorial measures (Adserà et al., 2003; Alt ”