Corruption in America

By Edward L. Glaeser, Raven E. Saks. 2006

910 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/d62252e6a985cdeb576a0ece3c5af59b84adc60b

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Citations in the corpus

Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States (2013, neutral): “Columns 3 and 4 add as controls other correlates of corruption that are established in the literature, and our preferred specification is that of column 3, which essentially reproduces the basic specification in Glaeser and Saks ( 2006 ) .”
Greasing the wheels of entrepreneurship (2007, background): “As Glaeser and Saks (2006) show for the US, the negative relationship between corruption and economic growth of states disappears once state characteristics are accounted for.”
The social cost of rent seeking in Europe (2009, background): “Fo instance, Park et al. (2005) provide evidence of a positive correlation between fiscal size and rent seeking in 108 countries, and Glaeser and Saks (2006) find a weak positive relationship between bigger governments and corruption using data for states in the US.”
Women and corruption: What positions must they hold to make a difference? (2014, methodology): “To overcome this concern, we report the CLR, AR and LM-J statistics, and 95% confidence sets based on the CLR approach using the methods discussed in Finlay and Magnusson (2009) that allow for robust standard errors.(22) In all our specifications, all the three statistics (the CLR and the AR in colu”
The Politics of Government Investment (2012, neutral): “Silanes, 1999; Glaeser and Saks, 2006). R. Duchin, D. Sosyura / Journal of Financial Economics 106 (2012) 24–48 26”
Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy? (2008, methodology): “We construct the instrument using data on the determinants of federal corruption convictions at the state level assembled by Glaeser and Saks (2006). We measure corruption culture as the residual from a regression of convictions on economic and social characteristics of the state.”
Political Geography and Stock Returns: The Value and Risk Implications of Proximity to Political Power (2012, neutral): “The conviction rate has been used as a proxy of political corruption by Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2009), Fisman and Gatti (2002), Fredriksson, List, and Millimet (2003), and Glaeser and Saks (2006), among others.”
The Corporate Value of (Corrupt) Lobbying (2016, neutral): “Corruption Corruption Rate is based on Glaeser and Saks (2006) and measures the number of convictions of public officials for corruption during 1976-2002 relative to the average population in the state.”