The Effect of Employment Protection on Worker Effort: Absenteeism During and After Probation

By Andrea Ichino, R. Riphahn. 2005

376 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Economics and Econometrics, General Health Professions

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a40c037ab96693fffcd305e63057f06f8f4e6da0

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Citations in the corpus

The Effect of Employment Protection Legislation and Financial Market Imperfections on Investment: Evidence from a Firm-Level Panel of EU Countries (2009, positive): “9 Ichino and Riphahn (2005) and Riphahn (2005) claim that layoff protection (or the lack thereof during the probation period) might also affect productivity by reducing worker effort because there is less threat of layoff in response to poor w rk performance or absenteeism. b) Considerations…”
A Natural Experiment on Sick Pay Cuts, Sickness Absence, and Labor Costs (2010, background): “Workplace conditions are relevant,(Dionne and Dostie, 2007) as are probation periods and economic upswings or downturns (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Askildsen et al., 2005).”
Worker Absence and Shirking: Evidence from Matched Teacher-School Data, Labour Economics Research Group (LERG) Discussion Paper Series, June 2005 (2007, background): “Teachers on temporary contracts have absenteeism rates 22%-24% lower than permanent teachers, which is consistent with earlier evidence on contract status e¤ects in the private sector (Ichino and Riphahn 2005).”
Dismissals for Cause: The Difference That Just Eight Paragraphs Can Make (2009, positive): “…to wait for a decision by the employment court, which can take several months. and Bonin 2007; Varejao and Portugal 2007; Kugler and Pica 2008; Marinescu 2008) but also productivity (Besley and Burgess 2004; Ichino and Riphahn 2005; Autor, Kugler, and Kerr 2007) and wages (Leonardi and Pica 2007).”
Who Pays for It? The Heterogeneous Wage Effects of Employment Protection Legislation (2013, positive): “The empirical studies analysing the relationship between EPL and workers’ tenure profile go beyond the standard matching model and are typically based on incentive mechanisms (Autor, 2003; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Wasmer, 2006; Belot et al., 2007; Scoppa, 2010).”
The Pros and Cons of Sick Pay Schemes: Testing for Contagious Presenteeism and Noncontagious Absenteeism Behavior (2016, background): “…at and decomposed general determinants (Barmby et al. 1994; Markussen et al. 2011), investigated the impact of probation periods (Riphahn 2004; Ichino and Riphahn 2005), culture (Ichino and Maggi 2000), gender (Ichino and Moretti 2009; Gilleskie 2010), income taxes (Dale-Olsen 2013), and…”
Temporary Employment, Job Flows and Productivity: A Tale of Two Reforms (2012, positive): “…of workers and jobs across industries and rms by inducing substitution of speci c for general skills (Wasmer, 2006); reduces workers e¤ort (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Riphahn and Engellandt, 2005; Dolado et al., 2012); reduces the undertaking of highly productive but risky activities…”