Wealth and Executive Compensation

By Bo Becker. 2006

140 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Political Science and International Relations

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a3905c55a6958954e730280ba23ec9b38367a53c

Citations in the corpus

• Legal Insider Trading and Market Efficiency (2008, unknown): “Price sensitivity change due to abnormal insider trades Since their physical and human capital is invested disproportionately in their company (see, for example, Hall and Murphy, 2002; Becker, 2006), insiders are known to be structurally more frequently sellers than buyers of their own company stock”
• CEO Risk-Related Incentives and Income Smoothing (2009, unknown): “More years could signify a more diversified portfolio (Becker, 2006).”
• Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms (2015, unknown): “Kaplan and Stromberg (2005) find small effects of exogenous risk on venture capital contracts while Becker (2006) finds higher wealth CEOs receive stronger incentives among Swedish firms.”
• Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “Furthermore, Becker (2006) examined the effect of wealth on risk aversion.”